Research
Articles
"Agency of Belief and Intention" (2017) Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784
In this paper, I argue that belief and intention are equally agential. First, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. I show that the arguments for rejecting agency of belief are also arguments for rejecting agency of intention. The arguments that support agency of intention also support agency of belief. We should treat agency of belief and intention alike. Either we are agents with respect to both, or with respect to neither. Once I have established the conditional parity thesis, I use it to motivate a categorical parity thesis: we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency.
"Epistemic Schmagency" (2018). Metaepistemology – Realism and Anti-Realism, Eds. Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna, Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection
"Evidentialism in Action" (2020). Philosophical Studies.
Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse.
But this debate fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: (I) The interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; (II) Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; (III) Agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs.
"When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds of Withholding." (2022) In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments. Routledge.
Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors conclude that no doxastic attitude is warranted. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of these epistemic dilemmas. I argue that withholding cannot be irrational in either case. But meditating on the dilemmas gives us an important – and overlooked – insight into the nature of rational withholding. First, rational withholding is a function of evidence failing to sufficiently support belief or disbelief. As a result, withholding is not symmetrical to belief and disbelief. Second, there can be two distinct grounds for rational withholding. First, propositional withholding, which arises when our evidence does not support belief or disbelief in p. And second, doxastic withholding, which arises when we cannot determine whether our evidence supports belief or disbelief in p. Accepting two grounds of rational withholding licenses a kind of Weak Permissivism. But this Weak Permissivism should not be troubling to anyone.
"When to Psychologize" (2023). Australasian Journal of Philosophy
The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we are in a position to know that they are in bad faith.
"Entitled to Attention? Cooperativity, Context, and Standing" (2023) Journal for Philosophical Research.
Attention is a finite, morally significant good. Attention is a precondition for healthy human relationships, and its absence can wrong others by cutting them off from vital human goods. At the same time, human persons have limited powers of attention. And so the question arises, when does someone legitimately command my attention? In Conversational Pressure (2020), Sanford Goldberg argues that the competent speaker has a default entitlement to normatively expect the addressee to attend, even if only for a short while. If the addressee fails to attend, the speaker is wronged. I argue that the conditions under which attention is owed to another are more restricted than Goldberg allows, and are sensitive to context and standing.
"Moral Grandstanding and Norms of Moral Discourse" (2023) with Mark Satta, Journal of the APA.
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding, and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others’ stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.
“Infection and Directness in the Interventionist Account of the Basing Relation” (2017) Invited contribution to Syndicate Philosophy book symposium on Kevin McCain's Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.
In Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, Kevin McCain puts forward a defense of an Evidentialist Explanationist theory of justification. In it, he presents a novel account of the basing relation. Drawing from the interventionist account of causation, he proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causation (widely viewed to be The Problem haunting causal accounts of the basing relation). In this paper, I will raise two problems for McCain’s account: an Infection Problem (in a Global and Local form), and a Direct Cause Problem. The Infection Problem questions whether the account can capture features that undermine doxastic justification. The Direct Cause Problem queries the adequacy of McCain’s account of basing by challenging how evidence could be a direct cause of belief.
Books
The Epistemology of Fake News, Edited volume with Sven Bernecker and Thomas Grundmann. Oxford University Press. 2021
Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social World, Edited Volume with Baron Reed, (Under Contract with Routledge Press, Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)
Essay: Resisting Epistemic Partiality: Character, Values, and Evidence
Do practical commitments require that we believe against the evidence? Recently, several philosophers have argued that our practical commitments – such as friendship and promise-making – make a direct difference for what we should believe. I argue that this is misguided. Practical commitments can make a difference indirectly (by giving you different evidence or directing your attention), but they cannot make a difference directly. I give two arguments for this, one from the nature of rationalizing explanation, another from the relationship between value and action.