Papers in Progress
The Ethics of Interpretation
Is the person grandstanding, or merely animated and sincere? Is the group rioting or protesting? Is a particular man flexing his privilege and entitlement, or merely asking for a fair hearing? In this paper, I explore the ethical question of how we should interpret the contested action of another person. A contested action is one where there is agreement on the basic form of the act – certain bodily movements were performed – but there is not agreement on the significance or moral status of those bodily movements. The question matters because which interpretation we endorse will determine whether the other person is blamed, praised, admired, or excused. The quality of our relationships depends on how we interpret each other. In this paper, I explore two seeming defaults – the authority of the agent to say what she is doing, and the role of social scripts in determining the meaning of an action – and I argue that they are insufficient to guide us in settling on an interpretation of a contested action. Instead, I defend a principle of attunement, drawn from the work of Simone Weil.
Goodtalks, UT Austin, Handout (11.18_handout.docx)
Ethics and Epistemology: Contemporary Intersections (Powerpoint 8/16/22)
Paper Draft, Humanities Center Version (10/11/21)
TVA Powerpoint (11/12/21)
Knowledge through Narrative
Narratives pervade our reasoning. They shape what we view as salient, likely, repugnant, expected and reviled. They are curiously unmoored from the actual world. And yet, we reason through them to determine what to believe, how to live, who to respect, and what to think is plausible. A tempting answer is that all reasoning through narrative is deficient, despite its ubiquity. I argue that this is mistaken. Some narratives are better than others. And some can even give us knowledge.
- Draft, Saint Louis Area Conference in Reasons and Rationality, May 22, 2022
- Handout, Function First Epistemology Workshop @ Fordham University, 5/27 - 28, 2022
Repugnant Reasoning: A Social normative account of the wrongs of sexist and racist reasoning
In this talk, I examine a phenomenon which I will Repugnant Reasoning. Repugnant Reasoning is reasoning that goes through reliable but problematic stereotypes (“Asian diners tip less than average, so this Asian diner will not tip well”). Recent work has offered a theoretical characterization of Repugnant Reasoning according to which ordinary statistical reasoning risks moral wrong. On this view (called Moral Encroachment), since the risk of moral wrong raises the moral stakes of belief, we aren’t epistemically justified in the conclusions we draw through Repugnant Reasoning.
I argue that this analysis goes wrong twice: first, it gives a mistaken theoretical characterization of the reasoning taking place. We should understand Repugnant Reasoning as emerging from problematic social scripts. Second, it the account of moral risk does not stand up to scrutiny. Instead, I offer an account of Repugnant Reasoning that explains the repugnance of such reasoning by appealing to implicit normative expectations that are embedded in the social scripts at work.
Central APA Handout, March 2022
Resisting Epistemic Partiality: Character, Values, and Evidence
Do practical commitments require that we believe against the evidence? Recently, several philosophers have argued that our practical commitments – such as friendship and promise-making – make a direct difference for what we should believe. I argue that this is misguided. Practical commitments can make a difference indirectly (by giving you different evidence or directing your attention), but they cannot make a difference directly. I give two arguments for this, one from the nature of rationalizing explanation, another from the relationship between value and action.
- (Handout: Bookies, Believers and Bad Friends, TTU Brownbag (1.30.2019))
- (Paper Draft, 12.1.2019)
Against Charity
Philosophers adhere to a “principle of charity” towards both persons and texts, but the reasons for this are rarely articulated, and when they are it is unclear why they would have universal appeal. In this paper, I consider three defenses: Davidsonian Charity, Christian Charity, and Agential Charity. I argue that Davidsonian Charity should only be appealing if we accept Davidson’s anti-realism about truth. Christian Charity should be rejected because it leads to the entrenchment of abusers. And Agential Charity fails to track the ethically significant features of our relationship with other persons. I then examine the supposed parallel between texts and persons. I argue that we should not adopt a uniform principle because persons are morally significant in a way texts are not. Finally, I argue that we ought to adopt a principle of justice – rather than a principle of charity – to shape our interpretation towards others.